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This article reviews recent French efforts to limit access to asylum
and to streamline the processing of asylum claims. Requests for asylum
in France steadily increased from just a few thousand per year in the
1970s, to 10,000 in 1980, with 60,000 marking a peak in 1989.' This
growth in demand for asylum parallels what occurred in the United
States and most other Western nations.
In the United States, the INS received fewer than 10,000 asylum
applications per year in the 1970s.' While fluctuating over the years,
the average number of requests grew to about 40,000 per year in the
1980s.3 Since 1989, the asylum caseload has approached or exceeded
100,000 claims per year.4 Approximately 150,000 claims were filed in
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law: J.D., Ohio State
University (1977); D.E.A., University of Paris (1986); LL.M. Columbia University
(1987), J.S.D., Columbia University (1993).
1. Robert Sol6, Le flux d'immigration a augmenti en 1989, LE Mo DE, Nov. 7.
1990 at 1 (stating that from 1980 to 1984, asylum claims in France were relatively
stable at about 21,500 applications per year). The numbers began to rise steeply after
1985 to over 27,000 in 1987, 34,000 in 1988, and 61,400 in 1989. Id; see T. Alex-
ander Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Re-
public of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MicH. J.L REF. 183 (1984)
[hereinafter Aleinikoff] (providing a thorough review of French asylum procedure
through the mid-1980s).
2. U.S. DEPT. OF JUsTICE, 1992 STATISTIcAL YEARBOOK OF THE ItMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERvIcE 83 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE I.N.S.].
3. Id. Asylum applications during the 1980's peaked at over 100,000 in 1989.
d
4. Id. These numbers do not include the applicants who first raise their claims
as defensive claims in exclusion or deportation proceedings before immigration judges.
Id
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1993. The asylum officer corps is not equipped to process this volume
of cases.6 In 1992, for example, the 150-member asylum officers corps
processed only 36,000 of the 103,000 new cases filed.7 As a result, the
backlog of cases continues to grow each year and is expected to reach
600,000 claims by March 1995.
Since the peak year of 1989 in France, applications for asylum ta-
pered off by about 10,000 per year to 27,000 in 1992." France also
eliminated its 1989 backlog of over 100,000 asylum applications. The
time for processing claims through the two stages of administrative
review has been reduced from an average of two to three years to a few
months.' Both the reduction in the number of claims and the improved
efficiency in processing claims are credited to a number of significant
changes in French asylum procedure.
The United States is now searching for ways to reduce its backlog of
asylum claims and to discourage frivolous and unfounded claims." Be-
cause France successfully eliminated its huge backlog of asylum requests
and enormously sped up its current handling of claims, its recent refor-
5. Id.
6. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779, 14,780 (1994). Regulations enacted in 1990 shifted
decisionmaking authority for asylum applications from INS district directors to 150
specially trained personnel in the newly created Asylum Officer Corps. 55 Fed. Reg.
30,680 (1990).
7. INS Proposes Asylum Reform Regulations, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 445,
446 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779 (1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 208,
236, 242, and 274a) (proposed Mar. 30, 1994).
8. Roberto Suro, An Abundance of Asylum-Seekers: Overhaul Could Leave One
Million Stuck in Backlog, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1994, at Al (noting that this figure
does not include the over 100,000 Central Americans expected to be added to the
asylum backlog as a result of the court settlement in American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see Two Reports Recommend
Changes in U.S. Asylum Policy, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1364 (1993) (citing re-
ports issued by Harvard and the Justice Departments Justice Management Division that
recommend drastic changes in the I.N.S. asylum system).
9. Herv6 Morin, L'exercise du droit d'asile et l'dventuelle riforme de la consti-
tution: incertitudes sur le fonctionnement futur de l'office L'OFPRA, 'tuteur' des
refugids, LE MONDE, Sept. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Presse Library, MONDE File
(noting that since 1989 applications have decreased by about 10,000 per year to
27,000 in 1992).
10. Philippe Bernard, L'dpouvantail du droit d'asile, LE MONDE, Sept. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Presse Library, MONDE File.
11. See INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 8, at 1364 (discussing the ten year
debate regarding the need for the efficient and equitable adjudication of asylum
claims).
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mation of asylum procedure serves as an intriguing model of what
might be accomplished in the United States. The French reforms also
serve as a reminder that much more than numbers, speed and efficiency
are at stake in reforming asylum procedure.
The French asylum reforms have raised questions concerning the
French commitment to basic principles of asylum law expressly pro-
tected in the French Constitution.'- Bending to political pressures, the
French government enacted legislation in 1993 which limited access to
asylum in the context of European integration. 3  The Conseil
Constitutionnel, in its decision of August 13, 1993, invalidated various
aspects of the 1993 asylum amendments, finding that they infringed
upon the right to asylum afforded in the French Constitution.' The
French Parliament, with the assent of President Mitterrand, responded to
this decision by amending the French Constitution to permit the reenact-
ment of the invalidated legislative provisions. 5
These recent French developments provide an interesting foil against
which to evaluate the asylum reform proposals now pending in Con-
gress. France succeeded in speeding up the application process and
possibly discouraged some spurious claims. It is questionable whether
the current French procedure provides sufficient safeguards to avoid the
return of persons who legitimately fear persecution in their homelands.
This concern may have discouraged legitimate applicants for asylum
from coming forward with their claims. Continued review of the French
procedure may shed some light on these concerns. The French changes
expose the range of problems which must be addressed before the Unit-
ed States adopts international agreements allocating responsibility for
determining asylum claims. 6
12. CONST. of 1958, pmbl. (Fr.).
13. Decision of August 13, 1993, Conseil Constitutionnel [Con. Const.] No. 93-
325 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Public Library, CONSTI File (reviewing provisions of
legislation concerning control of immigration and conditions of entry, reception, and
stay of foreigners in France).
14. Id. The Conseil Constitutionnel, created by the 1958 Constitution. is the only
French forum available for constitutional review of legislation. Id. Challenges to legis-
lation must be raised during the interval between passage by Parliament and promul-
gation by the President. CONST. of 1958, art. 61 (Fr.).
15. Coast. Law No. 93-1256. J.O. 16296, Nov. 26, 1993. 44 Recucil Daloz-
Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 552 (1993) (Fr.) (concerning international agreements on
the right to asylum).
16. See Arthur C. Helton, Toward Harmonized Asyhtm Procedures in North
America: The Proposed United States-Canada Memorandum of Understanding for
Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third
1994]
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I. FRENCH ASYLUM PROCEDURE
The French tradition of generous acceptance of persons fleeing politi-
cal oppression, written into the Constitution of 1793, declared that
France "gives asylum to foreigners banished from their country because
of their struggle for freedom."' 7 Although never enacted as positive
law, the 1793. declaration served as a basis for government authority to
grant asylum. The Preamble to the 1946 Constitution renewed the
French commitment to providing asylum. One clause of the Preamble
promises that "any man persecuted because of his activities in the cause
of freedom has the right of asylum within the territories of the Repub-
lic."'" This provision of the 1946 Preamble has been recognized as
positive law affording a fundamental constitutional right of access to
asylum. 9
France quickly ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.' ° From 1950 to 1980, the processing of asylum-seekers in
France aroused little controversy. General immigration reform was dis-
cussed occasionally during this period, but asylum applicants had not yet
Countries, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 737 (1993) (examining the terms and provisions of
the United States-Canada Memorandum of Understanding and recommending changes
to the proposed agreement).
17. CONST. of 1793, art. I (Fr.); see Nina Gamrasni-Ahlen, Recent European De-
velopments Regarding Refugees: The Dublin Convention and the French Perspective,
in ASYLUM LAW AND PRACTICE IN EUR. AND N. AM. 109, 120 (Jacqueline Bhabha
& Geoffrey Coil, eds., 1992) (discussing limits imposed by the Conseil Constitutionnel
regarding asylum seekers).
18. CONST. of 1946, pmbl. (Fr.), translated in Henry P. de Vries, et al., FRENCH
LAW: CONSTIT.TION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION at 2-6 (1989).
19. The Conseil Constitutionnel has ruled that the Preamble to the 1958 French
Constitution incorporates as positive law at least some of the rights and principles
contained in the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution. The Conseil Constitutionnel has,
for example, invalidated legislation on grounds that it interfered with the right to
strike guaranteed by the Preamble of 1946. Decision of July 25, 1979, Con. const.,
1980 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 201 (Fr.). In a more recent
decision, the Conseil Constitutionnel has recognized the right to asylum provision of
the 1946 Preamble as having the force of positive law. Decision of Feb. 25, 1992,
Cons. const. No. 92-307 (Fr.) available in LEXIS, Public Library, CONSTI File (up-
holding the 1992 law on fines for carriers transporting aliens to France without proper
papers but recognizing force of positive law of right to asylum provision in the 1946
Preamble).
20. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. France was one of the first six countries to
ratify the Convention.
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been targeted by anti-immigrant or xenophobic movements." Asylum
reform first emerged as a key issue in the mid-1980s, and has since re-
mained one of France's foremost political issues.'
The current attention to asylum in France stems from a combination
of factors including a difficult economic climate, high unemployment,
the recent election of a conservative-right coalition to Parliament, a
vociferously anti-immigrant Interior Minister, and national self-doubt
concerning the capacity or willingness to assimilate the most recent
wave of foreigners? It is striking how closely the rhetoric of the asy-
lum debate in France resembles the current discussion in the United
States. The media and politicians refer to "political" refugees and "eco-
nomic" refugees as if two discrete groups exist, each easily distinguished
from the other.' Commentators cite the percentage of unsuccessful ap-
plicants as proof of abuse of the system. A familiar refrain is that the
asylum process requires reform to close loopholes to illegal immigration.
In France, as here, the steep increase in the numbers of asylum applica-
tions and growing backlogs in processing applicants led to talk of an
asylum "crisis."'
If the -asylum reforms in France weeded out unfounded claims as
intended, the proportion of applicants granted asylum would increase.
Just the opposite materialized. During the 1970s, the approval rate in
France easily exceeded 50%.' The rate dropped to approximately 25%
of applicants' claims examined between 1985 and 1991" Overall, the
21. See generally John Guendelsberger, The Right to Family Unification in
French and American Immigration Lnv, 21 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1. 31 (1988) [herein-
after Guendelsberger] (stating that after the petroleum crisis of the early 1970s. France
ended all immigration of unskilled workers). For the last 20 years, family unification
and the overseas refugee program have been the principal means by which permanent
resident status has been acquired by foreigners in France. Id.
22. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 213 et seq. (discussing France's
asylum procedure).
23. John Darton, Vestern Europe is Ending Its IVelcome to Immigrants, N.Y.
TivmS, Aug. 10, 1993, at Al.
24. Tim Weiner, Pleas for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. Ti, ES.
April 25, 1993, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 219.
27. Jean-Claude Chauvire, "Vers une restriction du droit d'asile en France,"
Agence France Presse, Sept. 25, 1993 (available on LEXIS, Presse Library, File
AFP); see Herv6 Morin, Un quart des demandes d'asile examinees ont &6 acceptds
depuis 1985, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 7, 1992. arailable in LEXIS. Presse
Library, AFP File [hereinafter Morin] (stating that 78,665 out of 307,869 claims were
1994]
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percentage of successful applicants has generally decreased, dropping
from 85% in 1980 to between 15% and 30% in recent years. The cur-
rent French approval rate, however, remains higher than that of most
other Western European states.2
The average approval rate in the United States in recent years has
varied from 15% to over 30%.29 When comparing overall numbers of
applicants granted asylum, however, France approved an average of
about 10,000 new applicants for asylum each year since 1981,30 more
than double the number of approvals by the INS during those same
years.3 The following sections review the basic framework for process-
ing asylum-seekers in France and the changes in that procedure during
recent years as the government sought to cope with the growing num-
bers of applicants.
A. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
Since 1952 the Office Franqais de Protection des R6fugi6s et
Apatrides (OFPRA) and the Commission des R6cours des R6fugi6s
(Refugee Appeals Board) have been responsible for determining whether
applicants for asylum constitute "refugees" within the meaning of the
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees.32 The Council of
OFPRA, an autonomous body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
consists of a Director appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, six
representatives from various ministries, and a representative of organiza-
tions concerned with the protection of refugees.33
approved between 1985 and 1991).
28. Morin, supra note 27. In Germany and Switzerland, for example, recent ap-
proval rates have been about 5%. Canada's acceptance rate, even following a consid-
erable drop to 46% in 1993, is still higher than in most countries. Moira Farrow,
Canada a Paradise for Refugees Compared with Many Other Countries, VANCOUVER
SUN, Mar. 8, 1994, at B4.
29. 1992 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE I.N.S., supra note 2, at 83.
30. Un rifugij politique par demi-heure, LE MONDE, Jan. 28, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Presse Library, MONDE File (finding that France approved about 14,000
applications per year from 1981 to 1984, 11,000 per year in 1985 and 1986 and 9000
per year in the years 1987 through 1989).
31. 1992 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE I.N.S., supra note 2, at 83.
32. Art. 2, Loi No. 52-893 du 25 juillet 1952, reprinted in JEAN RONDEPIERRE,
STATUT DEs ETRANGERS 159 (1953) (Fr.) [hereinafter RONDEPIERRE, STATUT]
(cr6ation d'un office frangais de protection des rdfugi6s et apatrides) (Fr.).
33. Art. 3, Law No. 52-893, reprinted in RONDEPIERRE, STATUT, supra note 32,
at 159 (Fr.).
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The OFPRA is responsible for the initial determination of all requests
for recognition of refugee status. If OFPRA finds in favor of the appli-
cant, it then oversees the issuance of the documents affording the refu-
gee long term resident status. A UNHCR representative participates in
OFPRA deliberations and presents observations and suggestions in indi-
vidual cases. A 1953 administrative decree directs that OFPRA should
decide all cases within four months of receipt of the application for asy-
lum.' Failure by OFPRA to decide a case within four months is treat-
ed as an implicit rejection.
An unsuccessful applicant may appeal from OFPRA to the Refugee
Appeals Board. 5 Such an appeal must be taken within one month after
receipt of the notice of denial in the case of an explicit denial or five
months after filing the application with OFPRA in the case of implicit
rejection.' Upon receipt of appeal documents, the Appeals Board for-
wards the file to OFPRA which has one month in which to present its
observations. In some cases, OFPRA agrees at this stage that the appli-
cant is entitled to asylum and the appeal is terminated.
The appellant has a right to appear before the Appeals Board to pres-
ent his case with the assistance of counsel." Procedures for deportation
are stayed while an appeal is pending before OFPRA and the Appeals
Board. No time limit exists within which the Appeals Board must render
a decision.
A denial by the Appeals Board may be appealed to the Conseil
d'Etat, the highest administrative court. Although this second stage of
appeal is limited to questions of law and does not automatically stay
deportation, the Conseil d'Etat possesses the discretion to suspend depor-
tation while considering the appeal.
34. Dcret No. 53-577 du 2 mai, 1953. reprinted in ROND,-PIERRE, STAT.o supra
note 32, at 165 (Fr.) (concemant l'office frangais de protection des rdfugids et
apatrides) (Fr.).
35. Art. 5, Law No. 52-893. reprinted in RO,4EPMIERRE. STATUr, supra note 32
at 160 (Fr.). The Refugee Appeals Board is made up of members of the Conseil
d'Etat, a representative of the UNHCR, and a representative of the Council of
OFPRA. Id.
36. Art. 20, D~cret No. 53-577, reprinted in RoNDEIERREI STATtrT, supra note
32, at 168 (Fr.). The applicant's written appeal to the Board must include the OFPRA
decision of denial, if any, a memorandum presenting arguments, and all supporting
documents. Id.
37. Art. 5, Law No. 52-893, reprinted in RONDEPIERRE, STATUr. supra note 32
at 160 (Fr.).
1994]
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The framework described above worked well enough from 1954
through the late 1970s. As France restricted opportunities for immigra-
tion in the 1970s and immigration pressures increased in the 1980s, the
numbers of asylum claims rose sharply. By 1985, OFPRA and the Ap-
peals Board could no longer keep up with applications; the average time
from filing of an application with OFPRA to final decision from the
Appeals Board increased to over thirty months.38
While claims were pending, asylum applicants in France were afford-
ed temporary resident status which entitled them to work authorization
and government assistance. Even after denial of an asylum request, the
French authorities generally did not initiate proceedings to expel unsuc-
cessful applicants. As a practical matter, the asylum process, whatever
the result, ultimately led to de facto permanent residence in France. As
the asylum backlog grew, pressures developed to adjust the procedure in
response to charges of abuse of the asylum system by migrants who
possessed no fear of political persecution but hoped to remain in France
under cover of the asylum application process.
B. REDUCING THE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS
Beginning in 1985, successive French administrations enacted mea-
sures to discourage asylum applications and to clear the administrative
backlog that had developed. They hoped that rapid turnaround would
reduce the incentive for filing frivolous claims by diminishing the attrac-
tion of work authorization and social benefits available during the pen-
dency of an asylum claim.39 In addition, the government implemented
more restrictive policies on issuance of visas in source countries of
asylum applicants.
Accelerated processing required doubling the staff and tripling the
budget of OFPRA and the Appeals Board.' French officials stream-
lined operating procedures and established a computerized filing and
tracking system. The procedures required fingerprinting of all applicants
in order to prevent duplicate requests for asylum and to better track
those denied asylum. A number of "fast track" procedures expedited the
processing of particular classes of applicants. Within two years of imple-
mentation this combination of reforms yielded impressive results: it
38. Bernard, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. Robert Sol6, Immigrs dans la tourmente, LE MONDE, Jan. 24, 1991, at 1.
40. Philippe Bernard, L'accdlration des procidures n'a pas rdgld le sort des
diboutds, LE MONDE, Jan. 15, 1992.
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eliminated the backlog and reduced the average time for adjudication of
claims from nearly three years to under six months.4 The most signifi-
cant of the procedural reforms are outlined below.
1. Speeding Up the Process: "Procedure TGV"
In 1990, OFPRA began screening applications to eliminate those
considered not to merit an applicant interview. As a result, OFPRA
began rejecting large numbers of claims when its paper review detected
evidently false documents, clearly economic motives, or victims of mea-
sures which, although discriminatory, did not amount to persecution
under the terms of the Geneva Convention on Refugees. Applicants not
granted a full review as a matter of course came from countries consid-
ered generally "safe," including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Repub-
lic in Eastern Europe, Benin in Africa, and Chile in South America.'
The task of this initial sorting of claims belonged to specially trained
officers of OFPRA purportedly familiar with conditions in the claimants'
countries of origin. Applicants in such cases did not receive an inter-
view nor were they afforded an opportunity to appear in person before
the decisionmaker. Some files received only a cursory review prior to
rejection. 3
In 1992 and 1993, this paper review procedure resulted in summary
rejection of over half of all claims.' These rejected applicants are enti-
tled to appear in person with the assistance of counsel before the Ap-
peals Board where the reversal rate runs about 5%.45 Regulations estab-
lish an especially fast track for asylum claims filed by persons already
in exclusion or deportation proceedings.' In such cases, the immigra-
41. Philippe Bernard, Des refugis aux immigrds, LE MONDE, June 13, 1992.
42. Jacqueline Bhabha, Harmonization of European Immigration Lv, 70 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 49, 56 (1993).
43. See Herv6 Morin, L'exercise du droit d'asile et 1'6ventuelle rforme de la
constitution: Incertitudes sur le fonctionnement futur de loffice I'OFPRA. 'tuteur" des
refugigs, LE MONDE, Sept. 4. 1993 (stating that some files are rejected in a matter of
minutes). Immigration rights organizations have criticized the new procedure for fail-
ing to take into account the difficulties which legitimate refugees have in putting into
writing an account of the persecution which they or family members have endured.
ld.
44. Bhabha, supra note 42, at 43.
45. See J.O. 7857, July 5, 1990, 27 D.S.L. 289 (noting that the Appeals Board
now consists of several panels which complete the review of cases and render deci-
sions within a few months of appeal).
46. Interior Minister Circular No. 176C of Aug. 2, 1990, Demandes d'asile
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tion authorities notify OFPRA of the request for asylum and ask for an
immediate decision. Unless OFPRA determines that further information
is required, it renders a decision within forty-eight hours of the request.
If more information is required to develop the record, the applicant may
be assigned residence status pending a decision by OFPRA. In the event
of appeal from a negative decision of OFPRA, the public prosecutor
handling the case may, when the appeal appears to be manifestly for
purposes of delaying deportation, request permission of the Interior
Minister to immediately execute the order of deportation.
In addition to expediting the asylum application procedure, the gov-
ernment promised to pursue deportation proceedings against unsuccessful
asylum applicants. Through the late 1980s, however, unsuccessful appli-
cants were rarely tracked down and deported. That practice has changed
in recent years as the government takes steps to locate and expel undoc-
umented aliens. Fingerprinting of applicants since 1989 reportedly elimi-
nated a five percent duplication in claims.
2. Screening Out "Manifestly Unfounded" Claims at the Border
A 1992 law imposes strict sanctions on carriers who land undocu-
mented aliens at French airports or seaports. a7 Each port is to be
equipped with a transit zone for the detention of undocumented entrants
while awaiting deportation. In the case of aliens requesting asylum at
ports of entry, the law authorizes administrative detention for the time
necessary to arrange deportation of any person whose claim is found by
immigration authorities to be "manifestly unfounded."48 In this situa-
tion, the detainee may communicate with an attorney, an interpreter, or
any other person, and is free to leave for any country other than
France.49
prdsentdes par des 9trangers faisant l'objet ou susceptibles de faire l'objet d'une
mesure d'dloignement, available in LEXIS, Loireg Library, BO File.
47. J.O. 9185, July 9, 1992, at 9185.
48. Art. 35 quater, Ord. No. 45-2658 of Nov. 2, 1945, as amended by Law No.
92-265, J.O. 9185, July 9, 1992; see Jacqueline Bhabha, Harmonization of European
Immigration Law, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 49, 50 (1993) (noting criticism by hu-
man rights groups that such accelerated procedures do not sufficiently safeguard the
nonrefoulement protections of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention on Refugees); see
also Critiquant indirectement la ioi Pasqua, La Commission des Droits de l'Homme
s'inquietj des restrictions europ6ennes a l'asile politiqe, LE MONDE, Sept. 20, 1993;
Aprs son adoption en conseil des ministres: Le projet de loi sur l'inmigration est
vivement denoncd par les organisations de defense des droits de l'homme, LE MONDE,
June 4, 1993, at 24.
49. Philippe Bernard, L'epouvantail du droit d'asile: Le Dibat qui s'est engage
138
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As originally proposed, the screening and detention provisions for
persons presenting "manifestly unfounded" claims were challenged in the
Conseil Constitutionnel as infringing upon the constitutional right to asy-
lum. The Conseil Constitutionnel ultimately approved government
screening of "manifestly unfounded" claims at the border, but interpreted
the statute to limit administrative detention to the time necessary to
assess the claim and to require prompt judicial review concerning the
need for detention.5 Assuming respect of these limitations on detention,
the Conseil Constitutionnel held that the airport screening procedure
violated neither the right to asylum in the French Constitution nor the
Geneva Convention on Refugees.
3. Limits on Work Authorization and Public Benefits
In addition to streamlining the asylum procedure, French administra-
tions implemented measures to reduce incentives for filing asylum appli-
cations. A critical change came in 1991 when the Edith Cresson admin-
istration suspended the granting of automatic work authorization for
asylum applicants" and terminated various social benefits which had
been afforded to asylum applicants as a matter of course, in order to
further reduce economic incentives associated with the filing of an asy-
lum application. France now offers relatively less favorable treatment
than Germany and other European states where housing and work autho-
rization are provided to asylum applicants.'
4. Toward Temporary Protection Programs
During this same period, France implemented a program for providing
refuge to persons fleeing the former Yugoslavia, affording a form of
temporary protective status with more generous benefits than those avail-
able to asylum applicants. The difference in benefits served as a
sur la rivision constitutionnelle fait peu de cas d'ime rMalitd complexe et nuancse. LE
MONDE, Sept. 22, 1993 (stating that only about 4% of French asylum applications are
presented at the border). The other 96% are made directly to the local prefectures at
some point after entry into France. Id.
50. Decision of Feb. 25, 1992, Con. const.. No. 92-307 (Fr.). available in
LEXIS, Public Library, CONSTI File.
51. Circular of Sept. 26, 1991, (Fr.) J.0. 12606 Sept. 27, 1991.
52. Robert Sold, Immigrms dans la tourmente, LE MOND. Jan. 24. 1991. at 12
(indicating that France had provided about 3300 FF per month per adult to asylum
applicants).
53. Bernard, supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
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disincentive to the filing of asylum applications by persons in this pro-
gram. Of 50,000 persons from the former Yugoslavia admitted under
this program, only 1,500 sought political asylum.'
II. THE LEGALIZATION PROGRAM
While improving the efficiency of its asylum process, France also
sought to deal fairly with those persons whose lives had been disrupted
by delays in the processing of applications. It did so primarily by insti-
tuting a legalization program for unsuccessful applicants who had estab-
lished strong ties to France while awaiting a hearing on their asylum
applications.
By late 1989, in addition to an enormous asylum application backlog,
as many as 100,000 unsuccessful asylum applicants remained in France
in undocumented status.5 Many of these applicants lived in France for
years while awaiting a decision from OFPRA and the Appeals Board.
During the interim, they arranged housing, secured employment, and en-
rolled their children in French schools. Some continued to fear persecu-
tion or death if returned to their country of origin.
In 1989 and 1990, anti-immigrant sentiment permeated the general
population. A lenient legalization program would have opened the ad-
ministration of Prime Minister Michel Rocard to attacks from the right.
On the other hand, the French asylum tradition and the pressure from
well organized immigrant advocacy groups suggested that some form of
legalization program was necessary. The government avoided resolution
of the issue until the summer of 1991, when measures to enforce depor-
tations led to hunger strikes by 200 unsuccessful asylum applicants and
massive demonstrations by human rights groups in Paris. After agreeing
to afford temporary residence status to the hunger strikers, the govern-
ment finally promised to enact a legalization program for other "well
settled" asylum seekers in France.56
The eventual legalization program announced on July 23, 1991 by the
administration of Prime Minister Edith Cresson, afforded long term
54. Hervd Morin, L'exercise du droit d'asile, LE MONDE, Sept. 4, 1993; Laure
Delrieux, Offensive du ministre de 1'int~rieur pour rdviser la constitution afin de
mieux 'maltriser' l'immigration, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 23. 1993.
55. Robert So16, Les clandestins du droit d'asile: Une campagne nationale en
faveur de cent mille itrangers auxquels le statut de r6fugif a t6 refus6, LE MONDE,
Dec. 7, 1990, at 14.
56. Pour raisons humanitaires plusieurs milliers de demandeurs d'asile ddboutes
vont tre r~gularises, LE MONDE, July 2, 1991, at 11.
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resident status to asylum applicants who: 1) applied for asylum prior to
January 1, 1989; 2) waited over three years for a decision (two years in
the case of families with children in French schools); 3) worked for
over two years (one year in the case of families with children); and 4)
presented no danger to public order.' Out of 50,000 applicants for le-
galization, about 20,000 persons eventually received legal resident status
in France."
Although the amnesty program affected only a small portion of the
asylum applicants whose cases had been denied, it did afford important
relief to many undocumented families in France and alleviated some of
the uncertainty and disruption caused by OFPRA's poor functioning
during the years in which claims were severely backlogged. Yet the
amnesty program did not solve the problem of the tens of thousands of
other undocumented foreigners living in France nor that of the thousands
who continue to request asylum each year. The government's promise
of no additional rounds of amnesty seems solid in the current political
climate.
Meanwhile, France and other European states sought to formulate
international agreements allocating responsibility for determining asylum
claims. The following section examines the importance of these interna-
tional agreements in the processing of asylum applications in France.
m1. LIMITING FRENCH RESPONSIBILITY
-FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS
The goal of free movement of persons among European Union mem-
ber states will eventually require the harmonization of immigration and
asylum policies. While the European Union has not yet agreed upon a
community-wide approach on these issues, member states of the Union
have initiated international agreements on removal of border controls.
57. J.0. 12606, Sept. 27, 1991 (allowing applicants three months, until Nov. 30,
1991, to file for amnesty).
58. Phillippe Bernard, La fin de l'operation de rigularisation: Les demandeurs
d'asile dibout6s seront peu nombreux a b6nificier d'un titre de sjour, LE MONDE.
Dec. 3, 1991; Philippe Bernard, La manifestation antiracist a Paris: Un
rassemblement pour la d6fense des demandeurs d'asile et des immigrds. LE MONDE.
June 25, 1992; see A. CORDItRo, L'IBMIGRATION 107 (1984) (stating that France had
previously granted amnesty to some 120.000 undocumented aliens with long term
residence in 1981). The United States similarly legalized the status of some three
million undocumented aliens under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
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These agreements include important provisions for the sharing of respon-
sibility and information on the handling of asylum claims.
A. THE SCHENGEN AND DUBLIN CONVENTIONS
In June 1990, various member states of the European Union signed
two international agreements, the Schengen Convention59 and the Dub-
lin Convention.' The Dublin Convention focuses on the issue of asy-
lum while the Schengen Convention broadly addresses a number of is-
sues concerning elimination of internal border controls in the European
Union.6 Both Conventions allocate responsibility for asylum claims
among participating states in order to eliminate repeat claims and forum
shopping for asylum.
The 1990 Schengen Convention originated in a 1985 agreement be-
tween France, Germany, and the Benelux countries to gradually abolish
checkpoint controls and to work toward free movement of persons
across their common borders.62 Under the Schengen Agreement, as it
became known, border checks were to be abolished for all persons trav-
elling between contracting states. Control of external borders was to be
strengthened and a system for police cooperation and exchange of infor-
mation established.
Chapter 7 of Title II of the Schengen Convention allocates responsi-
bility for hearing asylum claims. In principle, the Schengen state which
first offers a visa or residence status becomes responsible for handling
the asylum claim in accordance with national law, regardless of the
origin of the asylum claim.63 In the case of undocumented residents,
59. 30 I.L.M. 84 [hereinafter Schengen Convention] (applying the Schengen
Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between Governments of the Benelux Economic Union,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition
of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990).
60. 30 I.L.M. 427 [hereinafter Dublin Convention] (determining the State Respon-
sible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of
the European Communities, June 15, 1990). The Dublin Convention was signed by
eleven states of the European Community (all but Denmark) on June 15, 1990. Id.
Thus far, the Dublin Convention has been ratified by six member states: Denmark,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Id; see J.O. 2156 Feb.
8, 1994, at 2156 (indicating that the French Parliament authorized ratification of the
Dublin Convention on Feb. 5, 1994).
61. Schengen Convention, supra note 59, ch. 7 (addressing the issue of allocation
of member state responsibility for determining asylum claims).
62. Schengen Convention, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at art. 30(l)(a).
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the Schengen state through which the alien first entered Schengen terri-
tory is responsible for handling an asylum claim filed in any other
Schengen state.' Thus, Germany would be responsible for a claim filed
in France by an undocumented applicant having entered Europe by way
of Germany. Conversely, once Germany rejects an asylum applicant,
other Schengen Convention states would be free of any obligation to
consider the same applicant.
Schengen Convention Article 29(3) provides that "[r]egardless of the
Contacting Party to which an alien addresses an application for asylum,
only one Contracting Party shall be responsible for processing that appli-
cation." The agreement, however, explicitly grants each state the option
to afford asylum to applicants whose cases have been heard and denied
by other Schengen Convention states: "Notwithstanding paragraph [2913
every Contracting Party shall retain the right, for special reasons con-
cerning national law in particular, to process an application for asylum
even if under this Convention the responsibility for doing so is that of
another Contracting Party."' As discussed below, this safety valve pro-
vision proved to be important to eventual French ratification of the
Schengen Convention.
Asylum status granted by one Schengen Convention state is to be
respected by the other states and entitles the asylee to free movement in
the territory of the other signatory states.' The Schengen Convention
calls for exchange of information between the contracting states in order
to prevent duplicate or repeat applications for asylum.6' What remains
unclear under the Schengen Convention is how disputes between states
as to which has responsibility for an applicant will be resolved. Article
31 provides that a state in which an asylum application has been filed
should request the "responsible" state to take charge of the application.
If such a request is made within six months of the filing of the applica-
tion, the "responsible" state is then "bound to take responsibility" for
the application.'
64. Id. at art. 30(1)(e).
65. Id. at art. 29(4). Article 9 of the Dublin Convention similarly provides that
"[a]ny Member State, even when it is not responsible under the criteria laid out in
this Convention, may, for humanitarian reasons, based in particular on family or cul-
tural grounds, examine an application for asylum at the request of another Member
State, provided that the applicant so desires." Dublin Convention, supra note 60, at
art. 9.
66. Id. at art. 19(2).
67. Id. at art. 31(3).
68. Schengen Convention. supra note 59, art. 31(3). It is not at all clear that the
1994]
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
On June 19, 1990, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries
signed the Convention incorporating the terms of the June 14, 1985
Schengen Accord. Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, subsequently
signed the agreement. By its terms, the Convention for Application of
the 1985 Schengen Accord will enter into force upon ratification by all
contracting parties.
B. INITIAL TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE SCHENGEN CONVENTION
French ratification of the Schengen Convention in 1991 was immedi-
ately challenged in the Conseil Constitutionnel. The crux of the chal-
lenge was that abdication of responsibility for an asylum claim initially
filed in France would violate the constitutional guarantee of asylum in
the 1946 Preamble to anyone "persecuted because of his activities in the
cause of freedom."69 This provision, the challengers argued, afforded a
right to applicants filing for asylum in France to have their claims con-
sidered by the applicable French authorities (OFPRA and the Appeals
Board), a constitutional right which could not be denied by treaty or
international agreement.
The 1946 Preamble's guarantee of asylum arguably protects a wider
range of persons than does the definition of "refugee" in the 1951 Ge-
neva Convention. For example, Algerians who claim fear of persecution
by the FIS, (Front Islamic Salvation), may be precluded from the
protections of the Geneva Convention on grounds that they do not face
persecution by government authorities. The 1946 Preamble protects
anyone fighting in the cause of freedom without regard to the source of
the potential persecution." Even if the constitutional protection of the
right to asylum was no broader than the protection afforded by the
Geneva Convention, other nations may not apply the terms of the Gene-
Article 31 procedure would eliminate the "refugee in orbit" problem in cases in
which two states disagree over which is responsible for an asylum applicant. Id.
Bhabha, supra note 42, at 55.
69. CONST. of 1946, pmbl. (Fr.), translated in GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
FRENCH LAW: CONSTrrUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION 2-6 (1989) [hereinafter
BERMANN].
70. Philippe Bernard, Le projet de rivision constitutionnelle adoptd par le conseil
des ministres: I1 s'agit de 'rendre le droit d'asile a sa vocation premiere' nous dd-
clare Jean-Jacques de Bresson, Pr6sident de la Commission de Recours, LE MONDE,
Oct. 21, 1993 (noting statements Jean Jacques Bresson made as President of the Refu-
gee Appeals Board).
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va Convention in as generous a fashion as would OFPRA and the Ap-
peals Board.7
In responding to these initial challenges to the Schengen Convention,
the Conseil Constitutionnel found that the Convention could be ratified
as written without violating the French Constitution.' The Conseil con-
cluded that Convention Article 39(4) reserved to each contracting nation
the right to consider applicants for asylum who are the responsibility of
another contracting nation. The broad scope of this reservation of power
permitted French protection of the guarantee of the right to asylum
under the 1946 Preamble. In other words, the terms of the Schengen
Convention itself assured that the guarantees of the 1946 Preamble need
not be ignored. The OFPRA and the Appeals Board could hear any
claim in which the constitutional right to asylum was invoked.
Of course, the broader goals of Schengen, avoidance of forum shop-
ping and duplicate claims, could be undercut to the extent that appli-
cants in France insisted on invoking the protections of the French Con-
stitution in order to gain access to OFPRA and the Appeals Board.
When the French government passed additional legislation in anticipation
of the eventual implementation of the Schengen agreement, this constitu-
tional issue resurfaced.
C. FRENCH LAW IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION
In Spring 1993, France's newly elected conservative-right Parliament
enacted a series of new controls on immigration and nationality.'
These controls narrowed access to citizenship to persons born on French
soil. 4 Furthermore, a new restriction required affirmative steps to ac-
71. Schengen Convention, supra note 59, art. 32. Article 32 of the 1990
Schengen Convention provides that "[t]he Contracting Party responsible for the pro-
cessing of an application shall process it in accordance with its national law." Id.
72. See Decision of July 25, 1991, Conseil Constitutionnel, No. 91294 (Fr.).
available in LEXIS, Public Library, CONSTI File (finding no constitutional problem
with the Schengen agreement so long as it is interpreted to reserve for France the
right to examine asylum applications in addition to those for which it is responsible
under Schengen).
73. See loi No. 93-1027 du 24 aoflt 1993 (Fr.), J.O. 29 aoflt. 1993, at 12.196.
74. See generally John Guendelsberger, Access to Citizenship for Children Born
Within the State to Foreign Parents, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 379 (1992) (stating that for
over a century, children born in France to parents who were not French citizens at-
tained citizenship automatically at age 18 by the simple fact of birth in France and
five years of residence prior to age 18); see loi No. 93-1027 du 24 ao~t 1993 (Fr.)
(imposing a requirement that children born to foreign parents make an affirmative
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quire French citizenship, suppressing the old law that permitted auto-
matic acquisition of citizenship at age eighteen for children born in
France to foreign parents." The Parliament also enacted new security
measures allowing police to request identification and immigration pa-
pers.7
6
Another set of 1993 amendments to the 1945 ordinance sought to
close perceived loopholes in the immigration law by imposing additional
restrictions on family unification, by relaxing the rules for detention of
aliens awaiting deportation, and by further limiting access to asylum.7
These amendments would have placed severe restrictions on prospective
applicants for asylum determined by the local prefecture to be the re-
sponsibility of another state under the Schengen agreement. According to
French requirements, an undocumented asylum applicant must first re-
port to the local prefecture for temporary residence status before filing
an asylum claim. This requirement necessitates the prefecture's involve-
ment on a constant basis. Under the 1945 Ordonnance, the prefecture
granted temporary residence status as a matter of course to persons
indicating an intent to apply for asylum." The 1993 law vested the
local prefecture with the responsibility for determining Schengen respon-
sibility and barred aliens determined to be the responsibility of another
state from submitting an asylum application to OFPRA. Instead, aliens
request for French citizenship between the ages of 16 and 21). It also afforded the
government the discretion to deny such citizenship requests in the case of various
infractions of the law. Id.
75. Decision of July 20, 1993, Con. const. No. 93-321, available in LEXIS,
Public Library, CONSTI File, The Conseil Constitutionnel upheld most provisions of
the nationality law amendments, finding that the jus soli principle was not a funda-
mental or constitutional principle of French law and was therefore not immune from
legislative adjustment. Id; see Thierry Brehier, Saisi par les Parlementaires Socialistes
et Communistes, le Conseil Constitutionnel valide la rdforme du Code le la
Nationalitd, LE MONDE, July 22, 1993 (noting that the Conseil invalidated a provision
authorizing denial of requests for citizenship for minor infractions such as illegal resi-
dence in France, finding the consequence of loss of access to citizenship dispropor-
tionate to the offense). It upheld denial of citizenship for more serious offenses. Id.
76. La nouvelle loi sur les contr6les d'identitj est entree en vigneur, LE MONDE,
Aug. 12, 1993, at 12.
77. See loi No. 93-1027 du 24 aofit 1993 (Fr.) (amending Ordonnance No. 45-
2658 du 2 novembre 1945 (Fr.) to add new restrictions on immigration through mar-
riage, family unification and on applicants for asylum).
78. Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 214.
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would be directly deported to the country responsible under Schengen
for determining their asylum claim."
These asylum amendments would have also barred several other cate-
gories of aliens from access to temporary residence status during the
application process.' Under Article 31 of the amendments, the local
prefecture was instructed to deny admission to temporary residence
status to three categories of prospective asylum applicants: 1) those who
have a safe haven available in another country which would admit them
and not return them to persecution; 2) those who might present a danger
to public order; 3) those involved in deliberate fraud, or abuse of the
asylum process.8 Aliens in these three categories could apply for asy-
lum and remain in France during the pendency of their applications, but
their undocumented status would prevent them from qualifying for vari-
ous benefit programs and would expose them to deportation in the event
of denial by OFPRA.'
A group of deputies in the General Assembly and a group of Senators
invoked the jurisdiction of the Conseil Constitutionnel to challenge these
new restrictions on access to asylum. They objected to the removal of
OFPRA jurisdiction to consider asylum claims in cases in which the
prefecture determined that another Schengen country was responsible and
to the provisions directing that temporary residence status be denied to
asylum applicants in the other three categories listed above.'
D. DECISION OF THE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL
The decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel on the 1993 asylum
amendments resulted in its longest decision and one of its most contro-
versial since it began issuing decisions in 1958.' The Conseil invali-
dated eight of the fifty-one articles of the amendments and imposed
limits on interpretation of a number of the provisions that survived its
review.' The Conseil struck down two provisions amending the asylum
79. See loi No. 93-1027 du 24 aofit 1993 (Fr.).
80. See id. art. 31-1.
81. See id. art. 32 bis.
82. See id. at art. 31-1 bis.
83. CONST. art. 61, in BERMANN, supra note 69, at 2-24 to 2-25.
84. Thierry Brehier, Le Conseil constitutionnel et la loi relative at la matrise de
Pimmigration: Le texte de M. Pasqua comporte des 'atteintes ercessives" aux droits
fondamentaux, LE MONDE, Aug. 16, 1993.
85. Among the eight provisions invalidated by the Conseil. several would have
restricted family unification rights). While upholding a provision which extended from
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law on the ground that they violated the right to asylum in the French
Constitution. 6 The Conseil also ruled that other provisions of the pro-
posed amendments would have to be narrowly interpreted in order to
avoid unconstitutional application. 7
The Conseil opened its decision with an expansive review of the
rights of aliens under French law. Although noting that aliens are not
entitled to the same treatment as citizens in all respects, the Conseil
reaffirmed that the Constitution guaranteed to all residents, not just
citizens, a number of rights including the right to liberty and security,
the right to travel and the right to marry and lead a normal family life.
The Conseil affirmed that aliens are also entitled to social benefits so
long as they reside legally in French territory."8
In addressing the asylum issues, the Conseil began by noting that the
1946 Preamble of the French Constitution explicitly protects the right to
asylum to all persons who claim to have been persecuted because of
"activities in the cause of freedom." 9 Because the right of asylum as-
sures the protection of other constitutional rights and liberties, the
Conseil imposed a heavy burden of justification, requiring that legisla-
tion restricting this fundamental right would have to be shown to be
necessary for the achievement of goals of constitutional value.'"
Turning to the merits, the Conseil invalidated the provision which
would have precluded applications to OFPRA by asylum seekers found
to be the responsibility of another state under Schengen. The Conseil
concluded that the French government could not restrict the right of
such individuals to file a claim with OFPRA without violating the
French constitutional right to asylum.9' On the issue of the right of a
one year to two years the time in which an alien must reside in France before being
joined by family members, the Conseil ruled that students could not be denied the
right to be joined by family members. The Conseil also struck down a provision
denying spousal unification until two years after divorce of the previous spouse. It
also invalidated a provision granting mayors discretion to rule on legitimacy of mar-
riages for determination of immigration benefits. The Conseil relied upon the protec-
tion of family rights in the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution in striking these provi-
sions. Other provisions annulled were an automatic one year bar on entry from time
of attempted use of fraudulent documents and administrative prolongation of detention
for aliens awaiting expulsion. See generally Guendelsberger, supra note 21, at 31.
86. Decision of Aug. 13, 1993, Con. Const. No. 93-325 (Fr.).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. (citing the 1946 Constitutional preamble).
90. Id.
91. Id. While the legislation specifically limited its application to situations which
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Schengen applicant to remain in France during the pendency of an asy-
lum claim before OFPRA and the Appeals Board, the Conseil distin-
guished the situation of applicants who invoked the French constitutional
right to asylum from claimants who did not invoke this right. The
Conseil reasoned that the constitutional right to asylum ordinarily im-
plies that an applicant for asylum be permitted to remain in France in
order to be able to present the claim effectively. The constitutional
guarantee of the right to asylum, it held, imposes an obligation on
French administrative and judicial authorities to assure protection of that
right to all persons claiming they would be persecuted because of their
"activities in the cause of freedom."'92 This right to asylum requires that
applicants be granted temporary admission into France until a final
decision is reached on their asylum application. International treaties,
such as Schengen, which allocate spheres of competence in determining
claims for asylum, must be interpreted to protect this constitutional right.
Legislation which could potentially impact this right must be construed
strictly so as not to restrict access to residence. The Conseil concluded
that the constitutional right to present a defense implies that asylum
applicants be permitted to remain in France while awaiting the determi-
nation of their claims unless concern for public order demands other-
wise.93
On the other hand, the government could refuse to allow an applicant
to remain in France during the pendency of the asylum claim in cases
in which the applicant did not invoke the constitutional right to asylum.
Such applicants, however, have the right to apply to OFPRA while
residing outside of France.' Applicants within the other three catego-
ries of Article 31 bis, those relegated to remaining in France in undoc-
umented status during the pendency of the claim before OFPRA, could
be deported during the course of their appeal before the Appeals
Board.95
would not infringe upon Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, the
Conseil pointed out that the law must be applied in a way which would respect the
entire text of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees. Il
Such an approach to interpretation, the Conseil noted, was necessary in order to avoid
a violation of the principle established in Article 55 of the French Constitution that
treaties occupy a rank above that of legislation in the hierarchy of French law. Id.
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Finally, the Conseil noted that Article 31 bis of the 1993 amendments
provided that the state retain the sovereign right to afford asylum to any
person in one of the four special categories.96 The Conseil referred to
its decision of July 25, 1991 which held that Schengen and other inter-
national agreements that allocate responsibility among states for deter-
mining individual asylum claims must contain a clause guaranteeing
France the right to adjudicate under its own law the case of any asylum
claimant it chooses to afford such protection.'
E. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The French administration vehemently criticized the Conseil
Constitutionnel's decision that the Schengen agreement could not serve
as a basis for categorical preclusion of claims to OFPRA, viewing the
decision as an open invitation to thousands of potential claimants to
seek asylum in France.98 The French administration also attacked the
decision by categorizing it as a defeat for European integration, because
the French Constitution effectively reserved to France the right to decide
asylum claims that under Schengen became the responsibility of another
state."
The conservative government of Prime Minister Edouard Balladur,
prodded on by alarmist claims of Interior Minister Charles Pasqua,
promptly began a campaign for a constitutional amendment to neutralize
the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel. I° A good deal of discus-
96. Id.
97. Id. Decision of July 25, 1991, Con. Const. No. 91-294 (Fr.), available in
LEXIS, Public Library, CONSTI File.
98. See Apr~s la censure de huit des cinquante et un articles de la loi sur
l'immigration, LE MONDE, Aug. 17, 1993; Laure Delrieux, Offensive du Ministre
Franfais de I'Intgrieur pour riviser la Constitution afin de mieux Maltriser
liinmigration', AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 23, 1993; Oliver Biffaud. L'accueil des
rifugi~s et la polimique stir la dicision du Conseil Constitutionnel, LE MONDE, Aug.
26, 1993.
99. Thierry Brehier, Pour mieux contrbler l'accueil des rdfugids: le gouvernement
itudie une r6forme de la Constitution. un droit sacri, LE MONDE, Aug. 26, 1993.
100. CONST., art. 89, in BERMANN, supra note 69, at 2-31 to 2-32. Article 89 of
the French Constitution provides for constitutional amendment through initiatives intro-
duced by the Government or by Parliament. Id. Constitutional amendments ordinarily
become final after approval by a referendum. Sophie Huet, Vote d'une reforme de la
constitution Franfaise restreignant le droit d'asile en fonction des accords de
Schengen, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 19, 1993. Yet, a referendum is not required
in the event that the President of the Republic submits a Government bill of amend-
ment to a joint session of Parliament which approves the bill by a three-fifth majority
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sion followed about the need for a constitutional amendment, the best
procedure for amending the Constitution, and the appropriate language to
reverse the impact of the Conseil's decision without directly eliminating
the right to asylum guaranteed in the 1946 Preamble."'
On November 25, 1993, the Parliament voted into law the following
amendment adding a new Article 53-1 to the Chapter of the French
Constitution addressing the European Union:
The Republic may enter into agreements with other European states,
bound by the same obligations as France in matters of asylum and the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, concerning their
respective responsibilities for the determination of requests for asylum
presented to them.
However, even if a request is not within their competence under these
accords, the authorities of the Republic retain the right to grant asylum to
any foreigner persecuted because of his activities in the cause of freedom
or who seeks the protection of France for any other reason."
This language makes clear that the French constitutional reference to
asylum is no longer an individual right to be invoked against the gov-
ernment; instead, it is the state's prerogative to confer the right to asy-
lum at its discretion when the government identifies individuals in par-
ticular need of protection.0 3
After amending the Constitution, the Parliament quickly reenacted the
provisions of the 1993 asylum amendments which had been invalidated
by the Conseil Constitutionnel. °I With these amendments in place, ap-
plicants qualifying as the responsibility of another Schengen state have
no right to file a claim with OFPRA regardless of whether they invoke
a right to asylum under the French Constitution. Such applicants will be
of the votes cast. Id. Six hundred eighty-seven of the 844 members of Parliament ap-
proved the asylum law amendment. French Parliament Limits Political Asylum Rights.
AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Nov. 19, 1993.
101. Frangois Luchaire, Droit d'asile: faut-il reformer la Constitution? Point de
vue: Inutile, LE MONDE, Aug. 28, 1993; Patrice Burchkalter, LVentuelle rforme de
la Constitution sur le droit d'asile: une menace pour la 'Cohabitation Douce'.
AGENE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 31, 1993.
102. Loi Constitutionnelle No. 93-1256 du 25 novembre 1993 (Fr.), J.0. 26
novembre 1993, at 16,296.
103. At the same time, the amendment clearly reserves authority to consider asy-
lum claims and grant asylum on a case by case basis in situations in which another
European state has responsibility for the claim under the Schengen agreement. thus
confirming the guarantee in Article 29(4) of the 1990 Schengen Convention.
104. Loi No. 93-1417 du 30 ddcembre 1993 (Fr.) J.0. I janvier 1994, page 11.
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subject to deportation to-the responsible state under Schengen except in
those rare instances in which the French government desires to under-
take responsibility for such a claim. 5
Ironically, the Schengen-related restrictions on asylum applications
now lie dormant. After all the effort to amend the French Constitution
and enact legislation to implement Schengen, the Schengen nations de-
cided to further delay the effective date of the agreement from the target
date of February 1, 1994 to some unspecified future date."°
The French constitutional amendment, a shameful compromise of the
guarantee of a right to asylum, and much of French legislation designed
to enforce the Schengen Convention now appear to have been enacted
prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily. Nonetheless, the constitutional
amendment had an important symbolic impact. Invoking goals of Euro-
pean integration enabled the French government to proffer an ostensible
"community" justification for narrowing asylum protections, while pla-
cating those seeking to limit access to the French asylum procedure.
As this article indicates, France thoroughly reversed its asylum crisis
and managed to bring the numbers under control. Whether France found
the correct balance between expediency and principle remains to be
seen. The United States is now poised to implement significant changes
in its own asylum procedure. The following section briefly reviews these
pending regulatory and legislative proposals and suggests that important
systemic reasons exist for refraining from hastily enacting limits on
procedural protections for asylum seekers.
IV. REFORMING UNITED STATES ASYLUM PROCEDURE
Various proposals for speeding up the asylum procedure and for
discouraging new claims are now being considered in the United States.
105. Id. In Germany, the Constitution was also recently amended in reaction to
the over 400,000 asylum seekers who entered Germany in 1992. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, at 891-92. The 1993 amend-
ment diluted the nation's constitutional guarantee of the right to political asylum by
excluding from that protection persons who proceed through countries "presumed free
of persecution, ('safe third countries');" see Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against
Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German Asylum Amendment, 33 VIRG. J. INT'L
L. 503 (1993). The amendment also limits legal recourse available against negative
decisions on asylum applications. Id.
106. Philippe Bernard, Au nom de Schengen: L'ajournement de la mise en oeuvre
de la convention rend inopdrantes plusieurs lois contre l'immigration clandestine, LE
MONDE, Feb. 15, 1994 (declaring that Schengen states have put off the effective date
for the Schengen Convention indefinitely).
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The INS proposed regulations for "streamlining" the asylum process
issued in March 1994, closely resemble steps taken in France (and other
European countries) during the last few years." 7
One of the recent lessons from France is that adequate staffing and
funding, prompt consideration of claims, effective enforcement of depor-
tation orders, and a well-planned legalization program can reduce or
eliminate the backlog problem. Under current regulations, asylum offi-
cers conduct an interview, await a report from the State Department, and
then prepare a written decision granting or denying asylum." Unsuc-
cessful applicants may renew their asylum claims before an immigration
judge in exclusion or deportation proceedings. Asylum officers must
decide to grant or deny asylum and, in case of denial, must issue a
notice of intent to deny including reasons for the denial. The preparation
of the written record of reasons for denial requires analysis and attention
to detail in each case.
The proposed regulations would implement a "grant-refer" system for
quick identification of meritorious claims and referral of all others to
immigration judges in exclusion or deportation proceedings. Three as-
pects of the "grant-refer" system are expected to speed up the process:
1) asylum officer interviews with applicants will be discretionary," 2)
notices of intent to deny and written decisions in the case of denials
will be eliminated,"' and 3) instead of waiting for advisory opinions
from the Department of State, asylum officers will consult a database on
country conditions."' The INS has already instituted a policy of re-
turning "boilerplate" applications under regulations enacted in 1994.2
The proposals would also add provisions which will discourage asy-
lum applications. First, a filing fee of $130 will be required for each
107. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779 (proposed Mar. 30. 1994)(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
103, 208, 236, 242, and 274a).
108. See INS Proposes Asylum Reform Regulations, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES
445, 446 (1994) [hereinafter Reform Regulations] (maintaining that affirmative applica-
tions for asylum filed with asylum officers account for the initiation of about 90% of
all asylum claims). Defensive applications first filed in exclusion and deportation pro-
ceedings account for the other 10% of applications. Id.
109. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,780. Although the regulations offer no guidance on this
point, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner has suggested that interviews would be held
in all but "truly frivolous" cases. Reform Regulations, supra note 108, at 447.
110. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,780, 14,786.
111. Id. at 14,781, 14,786.
112. See 59 Fed. Reg. 1455, 1462 (1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
103.2(b)(8)) (clarifying that the applicant is afforded twelve weeks to respond with
additional evidence).
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applicant for asylum."3 Second, the new procedures will delay work
authorization for 180 days after filing of the completed asylum applica-
tion. The expressed goal is that nearly all new claims will be decided
within five months so that work authorization will rarely be issued.
Finally, in looking ahead to possible international agreements along the
lines of the Schengen and Dublin accords, the regulations authorize
eventual discretionary denials of asylum when an applicant is found to
have traversed a state in which the claim might have been presented:
When the applicant can and will be deported or returned to a country in
which the alien would not face persecution or harm and would have
access to a full and fair procedure for determining his or her refugee
status in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral arrangement with the
United States governing such matters.""
As in the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, the regulations make clear
the United States discretion to consider applications which are the re-
sponsibility of another state under such an agreement." 5
Bills now pending in Congress would make much more drastic
changes to the current asylum procedure. Some proposals would impose
an initial threshold test which would subject to immediate exclusion,
aliens who do not pass a preliminary screening test when they first
claim asylum at the border (e.g., "credible fear of persecution" or "non-
frivolous claim")." 6 This initial determination would not be reviewable
before an immigration judge or in any court other than through habeas
113. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779, 14,781 (proposed Mar. 7, 1993) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(1)).
114. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,783; see id. at 14,787 (proposing amendment to 8 C.F.R. §
208.14).
115. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,783 (stating that "nothing in this provision would limit
the discretion of the Attorney General to permit consideration of the application in
instances where there is good reason for the applicant to remain in the United
States").
116. Republicans Call for Immigration, Asylum Reform, REFUGEE REP. 1 (Mar. 31,
1994); Sen. Simpson Introduces Major Immigration Reform Bill, 71 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 311 (Mar. 7, 1994); Comprehensive Immigration and Asylum Reform Act of
1994, S. 1884, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), introduced by Senator Alan Simpson (R-
WY) on March 2, 1994. A showing of "credible fear" would require a demonstration
that "(A) it is more probable than not that the statements made by the alien in sup-
port of his or her claim are true; and (B) there is a significant danger that the alien
would be returned to a country in which the alien would have a credible fear of
persecution". Id.
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corpus.' 7 Others have proposed a time limit after entry on filing for
asylum."'
Analysis of the Congressional proposals for amending asylum law is
beyond the scope of this paper. In considering the desirability of legisla-
tive change, however, it is useful to keep in mind the peculiar systemic
limits which apply to asylum law in the United States. The French
comparison highlights these limitations. First of all, the United States
Constitution, unlike the French Constitution, provides no explicit pro-
tection of the right to asylum."9 Although the recent constitutional
amendment compromised the French constitutional right, the amendment
affects only the narrow issue of shared responsibility under Schengen or
other international agreements.'' It can be expected that future legisla-
tion affecting the right to asylum will be carefully scrutinized by the
Conseil Constitutionnel.
Second, to the extent that equal protection or due process might im-
pose some limits on asylum legislation, the United States Supreme Court
has assumed an extremely deferential role in reviewing laws affecting
immigration.'' In France, by way of contrast, the Conseil
Constitutionnel has assumed a more vigorous role in reviewing immigra-
tion law for compliance with the Constitution.-'
117. S. 1884, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
118. Comprehensive Immigration Control Act of 1994. H.R. 3860. 103d Cong.. 2d
Sess. (1994), introduced by Representative Lamar Smith (R-Texas) on Feb. 10. 1994.
119. Note the absence of constitutional issues in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
- U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
120. The French constitutional amendment represented the political will of a supra-
majority of representatives (three-fifths of votes cast), as opposed to simple majority.
121. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580. 588-89 (1952). The Court has en-
gaged in only cursory review of laws concerning entry or stay of aliens, emphasizing
that:
[a]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contempora-
neous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power. and
the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so ex-
clusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference.
ld. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting that this Court's cases
"have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sover-
eign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control") (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei. 345 U.S.
206, 210 (1953)).
122. See John Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and Resident Alien Access to
Public Benefits in France and the United States. 67 TuL. L. REv. 669, 681 (1993).
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Third, the United States is bound by treaty to respect the terms of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.' Con-
gress, however, has the authority to limit obligations previously under-
taken in international agreements. 24 Under the French Constitution, by
way of contrast, treaties have an authority superior to that of laws and
can never be compromised or diluted by subsequent legislation.'
Finally, unsuccessful asylum applicants in France who have exhausted
all French procedures may seek the review of the European Commission
and the European Court of Human Rights for enforcement of provisions
of the European Convention on Human Rights which relate to protection
of refugees."u In the event that the European Community enacts com-
munity-wide legislation harmonizing immigration and asylum procedure,
123. Although the United States is not a signatory to the Convention, it acceded
in 1968 to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees under which it is bound
to comply with Articles 2-34 of the Convention.
124. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581 (1889) (noting that the last expression of the sovereign, whether statutory or
treaty, must control). Id. Of course, latter passed legislation will be interpreted, if at
all possible in order not to conflict with treaty obligations. Id. In the event, however,
of clear conflict, latter passed legislation will control over treaty obligations. Notably,
at the time of accession to the Protocol, the United States included an "understand-
ing" which stated that its adoption would work no substantive change in existing
immigration law. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2253-4, n.10. In addi-
tion, the Protocol has been ruled not to be self-executing. Id. at 2557, n.14, (citing
Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 1982)).
125. Article 55 of the French Constitution provides: "Treaties or agreements duly
ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that of
laws, subject, for each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party."
CONST. art. 55 (Fr.).
126. See Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, App. No. 17550/90 15 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 62 (1992) (Sri Lankan citizens of Tamil origin whose asylum requests had been
denied by OFPRA and the Refugee Appeals Board alleged that their imminent expul-
sion by France to Sri Lanka would violate Article 3 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which provides that "[n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment"). The Court held unanimously that the case was not ripe for consideration of
the merits because French authorities had not yet commenced expulsion proceedings
and, in the event deportation was ordered, French appellate procedures existed which
must be exhausted before the applicants could invoke the protection of the European
Commission or Court of Human Rights. Id. Had the applicants exhausted all French
procedures, however, the court made clear that it would consider the merits of the
Article 3 challenge. See id. 89 (citing Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89,
14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 70, and Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11
Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).
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recourse is also available to applicants through the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg.
These aspects of the French system provide a series of checks on
political branch power in the area of asylum. In the United States, how-
ever, political adjustments to asylum rights are not limited by the Con-
stitution, nor by judicial review, nor by international conventions or their
enforcement bodies. Congress establishes the bottom line. As a result,
the American system for affording protection to asylum applicants is
peculiarly vulnerable to political pressures and compromises. This sys-
temic peculiarity in American asylum law suggests that legislative ad-
justments which diminish protections should be enacted only for serious
consideration when all else has failed.
CONCLUSION
What is clear from the French reforms is that improving the efficien-
cy of American asylum procedure will require significant increases in
staffing and funding. The French experience and comparative surveys
illustrate the need for better staffing of the asylum officer corps."z
France, for example, has a current ratio of one staff member for every
fifty asylum applicants." In the United States, when the asylum offi-
127. See SARAH IGNATIUS AND DEBORAH ANKER. NATIONAL ASYLUMt STUDY
PROJECIr. AN ASSESSaN,'T OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE IMIGRATION AND NAT-
URALIZATION SERVICE 61 (1993) (stating that the INS plans to first become current
with claims as they are being filed and then begin to work on reducing the backlog
of pending claims). If asylum applications continue to be filed at the current rate of
over 10,000 per month, it is unlikely that the INS will be able to keep pace even if
the "streamlining" regulations are enacted. Id. The proposed doubling of the asylum
officer corps from 150 to 300 officers may not keep pace with applications currently
being filed much less alleviate the existing backlog. lad
128. Senate Hearing Reacts to Terrorist Incidents: Calls for Asylum Reform, REFU-
GEE REP., May 31, 1993, at 6. The report provided the following statistics concerning
the size of asylum staffs in various countries:







United States 297 103.447
Austria 460 9,765
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cer corps is increased to 300 persons, the staff ratio will be about one
to 400.29
The French reforms also make clear the importance of eventual con-
sideration of a general amnesty program for those applicants who have
waited for many years in this country for processing of their claims.
The 1991 French amnesty program provides a useful model both in
terms of political feasibility and successful implementation.
Finally, the United States should resist the temptation to legislate a
quick procedural "fix" of the so-called asylum crisis. We should not
compromise the current procedural protections afforded asylum appli-
cants solely in order to reduce the numbers of applicants. The current
political turmoil in Haiti, Bosnia, and other areas of the world reaffirms
the need for an asylum procedure which carefully and thoroughly re-
views the claims (presented.
129. This calculation does not include the expected backlog of 500,000 claims and
assumes that claims will occur at the current rate of about 10,000 per month.
